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1. Introduction 
In a natural world presupposed to be dominated by causal determinism, the 
question of how the human being, a being that is part of the natural world, can be free, 
is one of the most rooted questions of philosophy and is often simply referred to as the 
question of free will. This question, by its very nature involves various approaches, 
including the questioning party’s knowledge, philosophical perspective, philosophical 
method and religious beliefs, which when taken into consideration, bring different 
matters to bear on the question, leading it to be discussed from a different angle every 
time. The primary reason governing the perpetual recurrence of this question can be 
attributed to its broad appeal, wherein the matter of free will has not been a topic 
isolated to the theoretical field of philosophy alone, but also holds deeply personal and 
existential value for philosophers. This is why there is such a substantial wealth of 
literature, which is continuously enriched and expanded, on the problem of free will. 
In this paper, I shall deal with this question within the framework of the 
linguistic approach adopted by Anthony Flew, a strong proponent and skillful scholar of 
Oxford Linguistic Philosophy (Brown 1996: 237-238), as well as an acclaimed 
philosopher in the philosophical and intellectual circles of the 20th century, owing to his 
writings on philosophy of religion. Philosophers who come from the analytical and 
linguistic tradition often focus on the problem itself, exploring the nature, soundness of 
the argument and the evidence supporting or refuting the claim. In this writing I will 
take a similar approach in evaluating Flew’s approach to the problem, focusing on his 
method, claims, and objections and on the degree to which he was able to justify these, 
followed by clear explanations of my reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with him. 
However, because I also think that philosophical questions are not asked in vain and 
that to better understand and appreciate a philosopher’s perspective, it is crucial to 
acknowledge the personal world view of the philosopher prior to discussing and 
evaluating a problem, I will first briefly try to describe what the problem of human 
freedom meant to Flew before addressing his claims.  
1.1. Why is Human Freedom so Important for Flew? 
In reviewing Flew’s work, it becomes clearly evident that in addition to his book 
Agency and Necessity and other articles discussing the problem of human freedom 
directly, he also made direct and indirect references to the problem and discussed in it 
different ways in his various other works, such as A Rational Animal and Atheistic 
Humanism. He must have had important reasons for doing so. Arguably, the first reason 
may have been his desire for personal freedom. If he had not had this desire, it would be 
hard to understand and interpret the passionate tone when he stated “Nor are we, nor 
could we be puppets” (1978: 195) written in a humanistic and anti-Marxist voice 
refuting historicism. Moreover, as a philosopher, Flew seems to have had so-called 
technical reasons to dwell on this subject. He states very clearly that many scientific, 
philosophical and religious positions have a first-degree interest in the problem of 
human freedom, including Skinner’s behaviorist psychology, Wilson’s socio-biology, 
all physics from Newton to quantum physics, Libertarian political philosophy, the 
Marxist understanding of history, which argues that there are inevitable historical laws 
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in human affairs, atheistic determinism as well as classical theism, which defends the 
co-existence of an all-knowing, all powerful God and human freedom (1989a: 223-225).  
For example, according to Flew, if the human being were not free, freedom as 
described by common sense, it would have been highly problematic in theory, although 
not impossible in practice, to build a foundation for human rights and social liberties 
(1989b: 69; 1993b: 293). Again, according to Flew, without assuming that freedom is 
deeply rooted in the human nature, it wouldn’t be possible to distinguish human 
sciences, which are based on the idea of agency, from physical sciences, which are 
based on causality and natural determinism. If we were truly not free, says Flew, the 
distinction we have been making between these two groups of sciences would be 
rendered meaningless (1981: 346; 1985a: 89-90; 1989c: 99; 1978: 89,91; 1993b: 297). 
He adds, if human freedom were not assumed as a factual truth, the notions of 
knowledge and rationalism would also lose their meaning (1985b: 49-60; 1987b: 401-
421; 1959: 377-382). Given that knowledge and rationalism assume a human being’s 
ability to choose, in a world dominated by hard determinism, neither knowledge nor 
rationalism has any more value (1959: 379; 1985b: 51; 1993b: 119-120, 128).  
1.2. Where does Flew Stand? Compatibilism vs. Libertarianism 
As can be understood, the acceptance of human freedom is a foundational matter 
for Flew and his philosophy. However, despite this, Flew does not take a libertarian 
approach to the question of free will. Instead, he adopts a compatibilist position, which 
argues that determinism and human freedom can coexist, where he distinctly rejects 
libertarianism and hard determinism in equal measure. Flew’s understanding of 
libertarianism involves the idea that as a free agent, a human being has an uncaused 
cause for his actions, and therefore he is completely exempt from the causal 
determination of the natural world (1989a: 224). The idea of hard determinism, which 
he rejects, argues that all actions of a human being are the compulsory and inevitable 
result of a pervasive causality in nature, and that’s why the human being, a natural 
being, cannot be conceived as an agent (1985a: 96; 1989b: 78; 1987a: 61). From the 
rejection of these approaches in the free will argument, Flew can be seen as clearly 
positioning himself against the incompatibilist view, which perceives freedom and 
determinism as necessarily excluding each other (1985a: 100).  
This gives us a definite idea about where Flew stands in the free will debate. 
However, Flew does not stop there but makes two more specific claims: 1) Our 
language practices are able to show us that compatibilism is true, in other words, it can 
show that even in a world that is causally determined, we can be free. 2) It is not 
possible to defend both the existence of a God as defined in classical theism and the 
notion of a libertarian free will.  
While Flew’s second claim has been discussed in writings on the philosophy of 
religion (Purtill 1977; Depoe 2005), the first claim has largely been ignored or never 
discussed in detail. Although in my opinion, the first claim is more important then the 
second for three reasons: 1) Since the second claim is a negation, Flew can leave the 
burden of proof to the theist and merely point out the problems of the notion of a 
theistic libertarian free will. As the first claim, however, is an affirmation, he does not 
have the same tactical advantage here; in other words, he is left to bear the burden of 
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proof himself. 2) Flew’s second claim is in fact based on his first. If the unsoundness of 
his first claim can be showed, his second claim would also be weakened. Otherwise 
stated, if Flew fails to show the trueness of compatibilism, his objections against 
libertarianism, particularly theistic libertarianism, would be rendered dubious. 3) Flew 
makes use of Paradigm Cases (PCs) to support his first and second claims, and he bases 
his arguments on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), where it is asserted “a 
person is morally responsible for what he did only if he could have done otherwise” 
(Frankfurt 1969: 829-839; 1988: 1-10; Inwagen 2002: 162), therefore taking an 
‘untraditional approach’ (Markosian 2012: 384) and defending the notion of a 
compatibilist agent causation, where the person is the cause behind his actions (Flew 
1987a: 158-159; 1978: 89). 
I believe that Flew’s objections against theistic libertarianism are disputable and 
that there are problems with his justification of compatibilism, on which he primarily 
bases his objections. The use of Paradigm Cases (PCs) to warrant his claims is 
insufficient, and even if PAP is proven true or false, in either case problems arise in his 
simultaneous defense of both the claims stated above. In this paper, I will first focus on 
how Flew justifies both of his claims and in the conclusion, I will discuss these claims 
and evaluate each of them individually. First, let’s look at how he justifies 
compatibilism.  
 
2. Flew’s Justification of Compatibilism  
With regards to the free will debate, Flew believes that determining the right 
question to ask is the highest priority. For him, it is wrong for philosophers dealing with 
this problem to first ask whether humans act or do not act with a free will, as asking 
such a question already posits the existence of or the possibility of a ‘free will’, and 
thereby presents an argument in favor of libertarianism. On the contrary, the correct 
question to ask should be whether or not the human being is free (1987a: 51-52). This 
question no longer highlights the free will but rather the notion of an agent. This 
distinction gains even greater significance when you consider that Flew avoids the term 
‘self’ when referring to the ‘human agent’ (1987a: 49). 
The main reason behind Flew making all these distinctions is his complete 
refusal of the notion of a dualist nature found in humans, as described in the Platonic 
and Cartesian traditions, and the preference he has to associate himself with the monist 
view of the human found in the Aristotelian tradition (1978: 1-2, 123-124, 222). This, of 
course, does not mean that Flew agrees with Aristotle’s ideas completely. But, like 
Aristotle, he does reject the idea of an immaterial substance within the self and attempts 
to describe the idea of the agent without making use of substance dualism. According to 
Flew, humans are flesh and bones (1989c: 101) and any discussion on free will should 
start right there. 
It is important to point out here that although Flew was especially emphasis 
adamant about holding to this distinction here, he still did not avoid using the term ‘free 
will’ in his writings, save for in Agency and Necessity, due to its common use in 
philosophy. This is why it should be kept in mind that whenever Flew has chosen to use 
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the term within the framework of his own compatibilism, he does not intend it to mean 
an immaterial faculty in humans called will, following his tutor Ryle (1949: 62-63). 
Looking at it from this perspective, the statement, ‘the human being is an agent because 
he has a free will’ would mean the acceptance of an immaterial self, which as Flew 
made clear, is false. However there is nothing wrong in saying, ‘Because the human 
being is an agent, she has a free will’.  In fact, for Flew, the term “agent” is sufficient by 
itself, adding adjectives such as ‘free’ or ‘choosing’ to the notion of an agent is 
redundant. Flew feels that even the most meticulous professional philosophers, such as 
Locke, ignore this redundancy, although our linguistic practices already contain the 
ideas of ‘being free’ and ‘being able to choose’ in the word ‘agent’ (1987a: 132). 
As a result, Flew thinks that our linguistic practice also assumes that the agent 
has the option to do otherwise. Therefore, Flew, along with most philosophers, seems to 
agree with the trueness of PAP, at least on a linguistic level. In other words, the 
assumption that a person is neither free nor responsible for what he has done if he could 
not have done otherwise is valid both for libertarianism and for Flew’s compatibilism. 
That being said, Flew asserts that our language practices not only point to ideas such as 
agency, freedom, choosing and action as well as to the legitimacy of PAP, but also to 
the existence of a physical necessity and causality. Flew’s ultimate claim emerges as a 
consequence of these: If our language practice demonstrates all these to be true, then the 
best position from which to argue in the free will debate is that of compatibilism.  
2.1. The Use of Paradigm Cases for Justification of Compatibilism 
Flew relies heavily on paradigm cases (PCs) to justify his claim that our 
language practices support compatibilism. Throughout his papers he regularly uses two 
cases, one involving persons threatened by aggressors, and the other, two young people, 
Murdo and Mairi, who are about to get married to one another. Flew employs the first 
PC to base the notion of freedom on the analysis of the term agent and the experience of 
being able to do otherwise, and the second PC to explain freedom based on the notion of 
action.  
2.1.1. Threat Cases: Agency, Being Able to do Otherwise and Freedom as 
Lack of External Compulsion 
Flew uses two different threat cases. In the first one, he asks you to imagine a 
person sitting in front of a desk with a document on it. This person is asked to “make a 
choice” between signing and not signing a document while someone from the mafia is 
pointing a gun at the person’s head. The gun holder tells him that he’s making him an 
irresistible offer, but of course, he still has the option of not signing it. The only catch is 
that if he doesn’t sign, pieces of his own brain will be appearing on the document 
instead of his signature (1990: 35). In this case, the person signs the document, just like 
most people would do. In the second version, a robber threatens a bank manager with 
his life and asks him to unlock the safe and hand him the money inside. The manager 
involuntarily does what he was told (1993a: 9; 1973: 234).  
Flew thinks that in both situations, we can still state that the people under 
coercion did what was asked of them with their free will, although involuntarily. There 
is nothing more natural than stating that as long as a person has the option to do 
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otherwise; he has acted with his free will. In the current cases, although the threatened 
people were forced into doing something, it doesn’t mean they didn’t make a choice. 
Often in such situations, we find ourselves saying “They didn’t have a choice” or “You 
couldn’t have expected them to act otherwise”. However by these statements, we mean 
that the people made the most reasonable choice, or that they had a valid reason for the 
actions they committed while under threat (1989b: 73). Otherwise, when we consider 
the fundamental meanings of these statements, we know clearly that these people could 
actually have done otherwise or that they had other alternatives for action (1985b: 55).  
The reason why some people may think the opposite is because they are 
confused about the prescriptive and descriptive use of the word “expect”. This linguistic 
confusion, says Flew, causes us to miss out on the essence of being an agent. For him, if 
we can resolve this confusion and grasp the true meaning of what it means to be an 
agent, then we would have to agree that although the agents in both cases were under 
coercion, they were still committing an act and making a choice, therefore they were 
free in the very descriptive sense of the word. If this fundamental descriptive meaning 
did not exist for the word, which points out to the fact that we could do otherwise, the 
prescriptive meaning of the word, which is used for making excuses, would also not 
have existed (1989b: 73; 1985a: 95; 1991: 55). Therefore, says Flew, even when Luther 
stated, “Here I stand, I can no other. So help me God” he implicitly accepts that as an 
agent he could do otherwise (1973: 235; 1987a: 65).  
As observed, in both of PCs presented by Flew, the keyword is “agent”. In these 
cases, the situation of people under compulsion are different from the situations where, 
for instance, a person is thrown out of a window with the use of brute force or that of a 
person shot in the back of the head without any prior warning. The main difference 
between the latter and the former cases is that the latter involves victims, not agents. 
Agency requires active and dynamic participation, whereas victimhood only requires 
being affected by another agent’s act. Neither the person thrown out of the window nor 
the person shot in the head commit an act. In each condition, what happens to them 
hinders their agency (1973: 234); in the second condition the person does not only cease 
to be an agent but also ceases being alive (1985b: 55; 1985a: 94). 
Flew makes the following conclusions based on these cases: Our linguistic 
practices show that in terms of our actions, it is possible to be under compulsion, to 
have an option to do otherwise, and to be free at the same time. In other words, those 
who commit an act under compulsion or threat are still committing an act just like those 
who commit it with their free will (1990: 35). But it is important to remember here that 
when Flew talks about compulsion, he talks of a compulsion exerted by other people, an 
external compulsion on the agent (1989b: 71; 1985a: 94). It appears that for Flew, as 
demonstrated in the threat cases, an external compulsion to the agent does not eliminate 
the free will of the agent, as long as the agent remains an agent. On the other hand, as in 
the case of the man who had been thrown out of the window, any external compulsion 
by other people that takes away the agency of an agent rids the person under 
compulsion of a free will. When Flew describes free will as ‘lack of any external 
compulsion’, only the latter situation fits his description of this kind of compulsion.  
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2.1.2. Marriage and Murder Cases: Action, Being Able to do Otherwise, 
Internal Causes, and Freedom 
Flew’s second set of PCs are somewhat different from the first. This time he uses 
PCs while he attempts to explain what it means to ‘act freely’ and ‘to be able to do 
otherwise’ by analyzing the relationship between our actions and their reasons, instead 
of directly analyzing the meaning of the term agency. Let’s assume, says Flew, that 
there are two ordinary young people, Murdo and Mairi. They have no conflicts between 
them and there is no societal or familial pressure on them. Murdo believes that he is free 
to ask the woman he loves to marry him and so proceeds to choose Mairi, asking her 
hand in marriage. The wedding takes place and the two young people get married 
(1955: 149-150). 
According to Flew, there is nothing more natural to say that Murdo married 
Mairi with his own free will and that he could have done otherwise. However, this is 
never the same as saying there were no reasons that determined what Murdo did, his 
acts and choices were uncaused, and therefore in principle, unpredicted (Those who 
knew Murdo and Mairi may have very well known that they were going to get married). 
What Flew means instead is that Murdo could have done otherwise, that he had other 
alternatives within the framework of his current state of mind, physical condition and 
his accumulation of knowledge (1955: 149-150). For example, if Murdo’s endocrine 
glands were not in their current condition, perhaps Murdo would not have thought about 
marrying Mairi and therefore not have asked her. We therefore need to accept the 
condition of Murdo’s endocrine glands as the physiological cause behind his action. 
This statement, however, does not contradict the statement that Murdo acted out of his 
own free will. While although his endocrine glands were the physiological cause behind 
his act, it is not reasonable to think of them as the only cause behind it, and we don’t 
interpret it as such in our linguistic practice either (1955: 152).  
It is not reasonable because in accepting one cause as the sufficient cause of an 
act means rejecting the possibility of alternative explanations that do not necessarily 
exclude each other. It is not reasonable in our language practice either, because then we 
would have to state that not Murdo but his endocrine glands made a decision to get 
married, which is obviously a metaphorical statement. It appears that for two reasons, 
Flew thinks that this statement cannot have a literal meaning: First, making a decision is 
an act that requires consciousness, whereas endocrine glands are not consciously acting 
agents, as humans are. Secondly, the glands are not external causes that coerce a person 
into acting out of his free will, but rather they are internal causes that are part of the 
human, without which the constitution of the human would be incomplete (1955: 153).  
Flew does two things by accepting Murdo’s endocrine glands as the internal 
cause of his action. First, he agrees that the opposite of volitional is not non-volitional 
but the lack of external compulsion or pressure (1989a: 225-226), and second, he claims 
that because our desires are not external causes, the internal compulsion they exert on us 
cannot eliminate volitional action (1987a: 122). In other words, our desires and motives 
do not serve as external physical necessities on our actions as asserted by hard 
determinism; they do not coerce us into anything.  
 
On Flew’s Compatibilism and His Objections to Theistic Libertarianism 
    
 
122 2015/25 
But how can we know this? Flew makes use of linguistic analyses again to 
justify his claim, presenting us with another PC, which could be titled ‘Who is the 
Murderer?’ Let’s assume that you are a detective; a murder is committed and you know 
that there are many people who have entertained the desire to kill; in other words, many 
who could potentially be a murderer. However based on your experience, you also 
know that a person is actually a murderer if and only if this person turns that desire of 
killing into the act of killing, otherwise everyone would be a murderer. Flew’s line of 
reasoning goes simply as follows: (i) Everyone has certain desires or motives to be a 
murderer. (ii) Nobody except the actual killer is the murderer. (iii) Therefore desires and 
motives are not in and of themselves the ultimate necessitating cause of our actions 
(1987a: 62).  
Nevertheless, Flew does not at this point deny that a strong desire that urges a 
person to do something can exert a serious compulsion and pressure on him. He only 
rejects the notion that such a compulsion completely eliminates all the possibilities to do 
otherwise (1987a: 65; 1989a: 268). According to Flew, our life experience is full of 
cases demonstrating that the desire to do something does not guarantee that we do it and 
that we can do otherwise despite our desires. Therefore, it is clearly false to degrade the 
human being into a desire creature, a puppet where desire pulls the strings, and to deny 
that a human is an agent who acts on his own will (1989a, 268). If our experience shows 
us that our desires do not coerce us into doing things that they motivate us for, the only 
reasonable conclusion is that human beings with desires are nevertheless agents despite 
the existence of these desires, and they can do differently than what they have done 
(1987a: 75). 
Flew is aware that some will object to his reasoning on the grounds that the 
reason we do not do a desired act is because we are under the influence of another 
desire that is stronger then the first. He, however, finds this objection seriously flawed 
for two reasons. First, this objection in its essence is simply another version of the idea 
expressed in different terms that a person always carries out what he desires. Therefore, 
it is not a proof but a tautology, and the burden of proof is on the objector (1987a: 63). 
Secondly, this objection seems to take the end result as a criterion when it comes to 
identifying which desire is stronger than the others. Therefore, it is merely a “since-it-is-
trivially-true-it-must-be-importantly-true maneuver” (1989a: 268). Flew thus believes 
that the objection is not strong enough to falsify the claim that a person can always 
avoid an action no matter how much he desires it. Although there is no such thing as the 
agent choosing her ‘original desires’ because making a choice requires the existence of 
both an agent and the options she can choose from, it is still possible for an agent to 
make choices amongst her desires to a certain extent, choices that over time become 
habits as they are regularly selected over others. Therefore, the human being is not a 
helpless creature of desire (1989a: 269).  
This result is not altered when we consider that human beings have conscious as 
well as unconscious desires. Flew expresses his view on this in A Rational Animal: It is 
wrong for the notion of compulsion to be expanded to a degree whereby it can even be 
determined by unconscious desires and forces, since the idea of unconscious desires and 
thoughts do not allow the responsibility to be transferred to anyone else but the person 
himself (1978: 191-192). This situation differs greatly from being psychologically 
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coerced into doing something while under the hypnotic power of someone else. While 
the latter involves an external compulsion, the former involves an internal one.   
It is also evident from the use of the word “inevitable” that internal compulsions 
like desires, passions and wants are not irresistible and inevitable (1994a: 24). In our 
linguistic practice, we do not employ the word “inevitable” to indicate helplessness 
when referring to the wishes of agents. For example, in the case of an attack, the person 
attacked can describe it as an “inevitable event”, but we know that it wasn’t so for the 
one who committed the attack, as we naturally assume that the aggressor always had the 
option of abandoning the act of attacking. Evidently, there is a significant distinction 
between calling the actions of agents “inevitable” versus calling physical events 
“inevitable”. In physical events, the question of “inevitable according to whom” is 
meaningless, while as seen in the example about the attack, it is possible to ask this 
question with regards to actions committed by agents. It is this possibility that allows us 
to use the word “inevitable” in our language, with regards to human action. Moreover, 
even the ability to ponder the problem involving the reconciliation of the notion of 
inevitability and human action would arise only if we are agents and have the option to 
do otherwise (1989a: 261-262; Helm 1997: 155).  
Why then do some fail to see this distinction? Flew’s answer to this is that there 
is confusion about the two meanings of the word ‘cause’, and consequently, of 
determinism itself. For him, the word ‘cause’ describes physical necessity and 
impossibility when used in the context of physical events. However, when the same 
word is used for human actions, it means something entirely different, as the human 
being has certain motives and causes for his actions. Flew adopts the language of Hume 
here and calls them ‘moral causes’, and asserts that since determination by moral causes 
is very different in nature than determination by physical causes, these two types of 
determinations would render different results. He explains that when you want to 
describe the behavior of a person with physical causes, you admit that the person did not 
choose this behavior or at least he was under a determination that he could not hinder. 
Whereas if you state that someone is under the determination by moral causes, you 
assume that this person could do differently that what he is doing (1994a: 23-24; 1985a: 
96-97; 1991: 60-61; 1981: 359-351). From a linguistic perspective, moral causes are not 
the necessitating causes of a behavior; they only bring about certain inclinations (1993a: 
10; 1994a: 24). As opposed to physical causes, they do not always produce the same 
end result, and sometimes the same motive can produce not only different but opposite 
results (1987a: 57).  
Here Flew makes use of another PC to justify his claim. For instance, we hear 
that an adversary of ours has suffered a misfortune. It is possible that hearing this may 
cause us to celebrate, to feel sad or to pity this person (1987a: 56-57, 122; 1993b: 297). 
However, this never means that we agree that the effects of moral causes are determined 
by chance. Chance always means that something takes place without design. But when 
we act volitionally, we act on design, not chance (1987a: 70). Therefore when we state 
that an event has a moral, not a physical cause, we do not mean that it has happened by 
chance. Just as in events that are the results of physical causes, those that are the results 
of moral causes do not leave space for chance (1987a: 69).  
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Flew explains the reason behind why moral causes have different effects than 
physical causes by making a distinction between moral causes as “moving” and physical 
causes as “motion”. ‘Movings’ are movements that can be started or ended by human 
beings, whereas ‘motions’ are movements that the human being has no control over 
(1987a: 133; 1985a: 91; 1981: 355; 1989c: 102). Flew perceives motions as the proof of 
the existence of physical compulsion, and movings as proof of a type of personal power 
within human beings. For him, similar to the way the determinism claim is based on our 
experience of physical necessity, the claim that we are agents with a free will is based 
on our experience of this personal power (1989b: 71; 1987a: 130).  
Flew’s goal here is to demonstrate to us that both agent causation and event 
causation are supported by our language practice and life experiences. According to 
him, even though their initial conditions are different, the results are the same in these 
two types of causations. Because once actions and events take place, their practical 
results inevitably occur. They only differ in terms of beginning causes. Since saying that 
an agent is caused for the event before it happens does not render the event inevitable 
and obligatory, but only gives an inclination to the agent to commit a certain act, it is 
not the same as saying that the event was caused before it happened (1987a: 57, 
121,122, 159). In the end, both causations are true since they are confirmed by our 
experience.  
At this point, it is important to note that when the word ‘experience’ is used, 
Flew is referring to an ordinary experience as a bodily creature and not to a purely 
cognitive, internal experience in the Humean use of the word (1987a: 117-119). 
According to Flew, due to Hume’s Cartesian assumptions that perceive experience as an 
internal and private experience of an immaterial subject imprisoned behind a veil of 
perception and therefore hold that reality can never be directly known independent of 
the mind (1994b: 101,104; 1987a: 67-68,128-129), Hume failed to see that notions such 
as agency or physical or factual necessity are derived from our own experience as 
bodied beings (1987a: 136-137; 1994b: 109). For Hume, the experiences of willful 
acting, being an agent and physical necessity are only internal and private impressions 
(1987a: 130-131). In a Humean universe consisting of such internal impressions, there 
are no actual correspondences for the notions of physical necessity and impossibilities, 
or the notion of an agent, be it human or divine (1987a: 126).  
That’s why it is essential in Flew’s compatibilism to accept that human beings 
are not only observers but also actors in this world. According to this, what allows us to 
know causality, and consequently physical necessity, as a reality as opposed to 
sequential impressions, is our life experience as an actor, an agent in this natural world, 
independent of our mind (1997: 111, 137-139; 1994b: 105-109). Therefore in various 
writings Flew presents four arguments, similar in their essence, which are built upon 
this kind of notion of experience and support the existence of agency, freedom and 
compulsion. His arguments can be roughly summarized as such: 
If we weren’t already free agents (and therefore not be in a position to know that 
universal hard determinism, or the refusal of freedom, is false) we wouldn’t be able to 
understand that agency, freedom, choice, physical necessity or all other related terms, 
let alone have these words (1990: 35-36; 1989b: 69; 1994b: 110; 1993b: 294; 1991: 55). 
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(2) If these words were not based on universal experiences that everyone is familiar 
with under normal circumstances, it wouldn’t have been possible to define them (1987a: 
133). (3) Such words would not have been explained or coined if people didn’t exist 
who enjoyed or suffered because of the experiences that these words describe (1987a: 
133). (4) If we weren’t agents with personal powers or never experienced what it is to 
have alternatives and did not have nomological propositions, then we would have never 
had the notion of counterfactual conditionality. However, we do have the idea that 
allows us to state, “If this hadn’t happened, then that would have happened.” Therefore, 
the ideas of being able to do otherwise, agency, physical necessity and causality must 
have an actual object. For Flew, it is incumbent upon those who are not convinced by 
these arguments to express how these ideas and terms found their place in language 
(1987a: 133-135; 1991:56).  
 
3. Flew’s Objection to Theistic Libertarianism  
The theistic libertarianism that Flew objects to is a claim that asserts that agent 
herself is the uncaused cause of her all actions, even in a world dominated by the 
omnipotent and omniscient God described in classical theism. This claim is similar to 
the common understanding of free will in the libertarian approach in its essence, where 
it perceives the human being as the sufficient condition of his action, and the causal 
conditions of the action as necessary conditions instead of sufficient ones (Reichenbach 
1982: 50). However, as a natural result of his own compatibilism, Flew objects to a 
libertarian understanding of the free will in general, and to the claim that the theistic 
description of God can be reconciled with the libertarian understanding of the free will, 
in particular. Here I will group Flew’s objections to theistic libertarianism under three 
titles in order to show and evaluate them in detail: 1) Linguistic and Epistemological 
Problem, 2) The Problem of Consistency, 3) False-Assumption Problem.  
3.1. Linguistic and Epistemological Problem 
First, Flew asserts that the libertarian definition of the ‘free will’ as ‘an uncaused 
cause’ is a hypothetical and arbitrary description that ignores the common 
understanding of the word in daily language, namely, ‘a person not committing an act 
under any compulsion’ (1989a: 223-225). For Flew, such a description cannot be 
reasonably deducted from the regular meanings of the words ‘choice’ and ‘action’ 
(1973: 237). When the meaning of these words in colloquial language is examined, it is 
clearly seen that their central emphasis is on having alternative options, not the notion 
of an uncaused cause. This is the main starting point of agreement for different schools 
of thought for those that oppose the existence of free will and those that support it. That 
is why libertarianism begins its argument from the wrong place (1989a: 224). This 
objection Flew has does not differentiate between theistic and atheistic libertarianism. 
For him, not only theist, but also atheistic libertarianism - as in the case of Sartre- builds 
arguments on such an arbitrary definition and assumes an incompatibility between 
human freedom and libertarianism from the very beginning, thereby creating a begging 
question (1978: 78). 
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Although a libertarian can object to Flew’s stated approach by saying that the 
idea of having an alternative would necessitate the idea of the uncaused cause of 
libertarianism. However, Flew’s response to this objection is very clear: There is no 
need to assume an uncaused cause; compatibilism can provide us with the same idea 
(1989a: 263). Moreover, Flew asserts, even if our linguistic practice supported the 
hypothetical libertarian definition of the free will as uncaused cause, it would be 
difficult to answer exactly and satisfactorily, in a libertarian sense, how a choice has 
been made or an act has been committed. In other words, even if we really had a 
libertarian free will, we wouldn’t be in a position to acknowledge it (1973: 237). 
3.2. The Problem of Consistency 
Flew claims that God, as described in theism, is not compatible with a libertarian 
understanding of freedom due to the qualities of absolute power and absolute 
knowledge ascribed to him. First, he refers to the absolute power of God. As Aquinas 
also agrees, says Flew, the teaching of creation in theism describes an omnipotent God 
who is not only the beginning cause of the universe but also the sustaining cause of it 
and everything within it. Differing from deism, classical theism assumes that if God did 
not exist and did not hold the universe in existence, everything would collapse (1955: 
148; 1987a: 85; 1993b: 63). An uncaused cause himself, God is the ultimate ontological 
cause of all beings, and without his determining, nothing can come into being nor 
continue its existence (1987a: 84-87; Helm 1997: 147). 
It seems that from here, Flew thus reasons that if this is the situation, then God is 
the ‘sufficient condition’ behind all our motions and our movings, meaning God is the 
ultimate cause of everything that the beings he created do. However, this also means 
that God is the only cause and creator of all ideas, choices and actions (1993b: 60; 1955: 
145; 1978: 107) and even the sins of human beings (1987a: 84). Therefore, accepting 
the existence of an omnipotent God of theism and at the same time claiming human 
liberty as described in libertarianism leads to an obvious contradiction (1973: 242; Helm 
1997: 147). At this point, it is futile for theists to succumb to the notion of an 
omnipotent God to eliminate this contradiction, as even God does not do the reasonably 
impossible (1973: 231). 
Moreover, for Flew, the theistic teaching does not only include the idea of the 
all-powerful God being the sustaining cause but also the all-knowing God, who knows 
what will happen in the future. Since a libertarian understanding of free will assumes, to 
protect the agent’s autonomy, that an agent’s future choices are unknown, it is in 
conflict with the claim that God has such foreknowledge (1973: 233). God’s 
foreknowledge determines how a human being will act. Making reference to God's 
wisdom and thinking that he would give human beings a libertarian free will, too, is 
false. Because only if you could describe two Gods, one all-powerful and the other all-
knowing, then would the absolute knowledge the one has keep human action from being 
compulsory. In this case, since two Gods would have to be different in nature, one 
would create human beings’ characters while the other would know them. However, in 
the case of theism, since both these qualities are found in the one same God, His 
wisdom is inseparable from and relies on his power and his knowledge (1987a: 77). 
 
On Flew’s Compatibilism and His Objections to Theistic Libertarianism 
    
 
127 2015/25 
That’s why in Flew’s mind it is reasonable to think that the qualities found in the 
God of theism, omnipotence and omniscience, lead theism to fatalism. In fatalism, the 
outcomes of events are inevitable and there is nothing that a person can do to change it. 
The teaching of fatalism, or predestination, is neither reasonably nor morally compatible 
with the libertarian claim of the free will (1987a: 78). Flew attempts to explain his claim 
by using some PCs in human affairs. For him, since there isn’t a sufficient example in 
the human world to explain this relationship, he uses the examples of a puppeteer and a 
hypnotist to make his point, which he finds to be the closest examples.  
He first asks us to think about the relationship between a puppet and a puppeteer. 
In this relationship, given that every movement of the puppet is manipulated by the 
puppeteer, just as it would be absurd to hold the puppets responsible for their actions, it 
would be equally as absurd to hold a human being responsible for his actions against the 
God of theism. However, Flew thinks that this analogy is not completely satisfactory in 
explaining the misery of the relationship between the God of theism and human beings. 
Since puppets do not have feelings and don’t feel pain, no puppeteer can be held 
responsible for a moral crime. Whereas in the relationship between God and humans, it 
is different. Human beings have feelings and are capable of feeling pain (1993b: 60; 
1955: 145). Therefore, not only is the teaching of predestination inconsistent with the 
libertarian understanding of free will, but also the awarding of human beings with 
heaven or punishing them with hell is unfair, immoral and arbitrary (1994a: 30). 
Moreover, for him, in addition to the arbitrariness of this reward system, the use of the 
words ‘awarding’ or ‘punishing’ are also meaningless, because if the said teaching is 
true, these words cannot have an actual meaning (1955: 166). 
Flew’s second case involves a hypnotized person who had been put under 
hypnosis by the suggestions given by a hypnotist. Here, both the hypnotized and the 
hypnotist are humans. However, even this analogy is not sufficient in explaining the 
misery of the relationship between God and human beings for two reasons. First, when a 
human being is hypnotized by another, not everyone involved is under hypnosis; there is 
always someone who knows the difference between being under the influence of 
hypnosis and not. Whereas when God is involved, all human beings are under hypnosis. 
Second, in situations where a human being is under the hypnotic control of another, the 
responsibility of the person hypnotized is not completely eliminated because we can 
always explain to the hypnosis candidate what it means to be hypnotized and ask their 
consent beforehand. Again, when an all-powerful God is concerned, it is different. The 
question of consent can’t be applied here because we are not in a position to know we 
have been hypnotized (1993b: 59; 1955: 145, 161,162). 
As these analogies show, the teaching of predestination or fatalism does not only 
prevent human beings from being an uncaused cause, as suggested by libertarianism, 
but from being a cause altogether (1989a: 224). Moreover, in such a teaching, God 
appears as a super-agent, who not only prohibits human beings from being a cause, but 
also eliminates her ability to do otherwise and therefore of becoming an agent, a being 
responsible for her actions (1994a: 29; 1993b: 60). In the teaching of predestination, 
with his unlimited power and knowledge, God is the sufficient condition of human 
action. However, theistic libertarianism perceives God not as the sufficient but the 
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necessary condition only. Therefore, contrary to the assumption, it is not possible for 
these two to be reconciled.   
3.3. The Problem of False Assumption 
According to Flew, in addition to the problem of consistency, another problem 
with theistic libertarianism involves one of its foundational assumptions. Theistic 
libertarianism assumes that since God is a rational being, it is a rational necessity that he 
creates a world in which the human being can do good or bad, right or wrong. It is 
because being free to choose between good and bad but unable to choose bad would be 
a contradiction and anything that is self-contradictory is not in God’s power (1993b: 59; 
1973: 231; 1955: 145, 153). Naturally, this assumption is based on a second one: A 
human being has free will if and only if he can commit acts that are described as right or 
wrong, or good or bad.  
Flew doesn’t seem to directly object to the second and more foundational 
assumption. This idea already assumes the trueness of PAP, which is accepted by 
Flew’s own compatibilism as well. Moreover, for him, the said assumption does not 
include the idea that wrong choices actually have to be made, but rather it only points to 
the possibility of choosing the wrong (1973: 232). That being said, Flew explicitly and 
directly refutes the first assumption, asserting that it is the very idea alone that leads 
theistic libertarianism in the wrong direction. Because for him, it must be possible for a 
God with absolute power and goodness to create a world wherein the human being 
never commits the wrong or bad action but always prefers the right and the good, while 
still remaining free (1973: 233; 1955: 149, 152, 155). 
Further, such a world is better than one wherein both the good and the bad 
actions can be committed. And since a theist perceives God as absolutely powerful and 
good, he should agree that such a God can, and should even, create this kind of 
improved world. Otherwise, while claiming human freedom, he would take away God’s 
own freedom by perceiving God as being obliged to create a very specific kind of 
world. Doing this, theistic libertarianism also limits God’s goodness. Because if God is 
absolutely good, as theistic libertarians think, he should prefer a world that is better for 
the human being as opposed to one that is less good. If he doesn’t do that, he is either 
not absolutely powerful or not absolutely good (Kondoleon 1983: 1-4; Yardan 2001: 
110-111). 
 
4. An Evaluation and Conclusion  
As can be seen, Flew attempts to solve the problem of free will and determinism 
by using a compatibilist explanation, and based on that, he objects to theistic 
libertarianism, claiming that it is a meaningless, inconsistent thesis based on false 
assumptions. As I had emphasized earlier in the beginning of this paper, since Flew’s 
objections on theistic libertarianism depend on the trust he places in the soundness of 
his compatibilism, the real question is how successful is he at justifying his own 
compatibilism. Because if his compatibilism can be shown to be not as sound as he 
supposes, then his objections to theistic libertarianism will thereby also be weakened. 
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That being said, his objections to theistic libertarianism can also be evaluated separately 
from his compatibilism.   
4.1. Difficulties in Flew’s Objections to Theistic Libertarianism  
Of the three objections Flew has against theistic libertarianism, I will discuss 
one, namely his linguistic criticism of the theory on defining free will as uncaused 
cause, while evaluating his compatibilism, and here I will focus on the last two 
objections. First, let’s look at the claim that libertarianism is incompatible with theistic 
teaching.  
4.1.1. Are Theism and Libertarianism Truly Incompatible? 
First, Flew’s claim that if a God with ultimate power and knowledge existed, 
human beings are not free in their actions, is based on the assumption that only one 
agent is responsible for an action. For him, in theism, this agent is God, the super agent. 
However, this assumption is not true for cases where more than one agent has shared 
responsibility (Helm 1997: 150). Flew perceives God as a super agent who can 
manipulate human actions, given that he has ultimate power and is the sustaining cause 
of everything. However, similar to how we don’t have any proof that a human being 
with manipulating power manipulates others all the time, we also cannot prove that God 
is manipulating human actions at all times just because he has the manipulative power 
to do so (Helm 1997: 152). 
In theism, God is also described as a being with not only absolute power but also 
absolute will. Having absolute will describes a quality of competence. A God who is 
described as the perfect being cannot be thought not to have perfect will. In that case, he 
would be an incompetent, imperfect God, which cannot be accepted by theism. 
If God is a being with absolute will, then Flew’s claim that theism necessitates 
fatalism becomes disputable. This claim would only be viable if we bring forth certain 
qualities of God, such as his absolute power and knowledge and ignore others, in this 
case, his absolute will. Flew’s assertion that God’s wisdom relies on his power and 
knowledge can only be justified like this. But, once God’s will is highlighted, it is also 
necessary to acknowledge that his wisdom will rely on his will and his choices as well. 
It is reasonably imaginable that a being with ultimate will would limit his own will and 
power to allow human beings to have freedom in action. In such a case, God would not 
have predetermined all the desires and actions of human beings, but only the 
preliminary desires. This idea does not lead us into fatalism. Here Flew, too, accepts 
that human beings are not capable of choosing their own preliminary desires even in a 
world without God.  
Flew’s objection that theism’s omniscient God and libertarianism, where an 
agent’s actions cannot be known prior to committing them, are irreconcilable, is not 
applicable for at least certain understandings of theism. For example in the process 
theism, also known as open theism, God’s omniscience is interpreted as him knowing 
the possible as possible and the actual as actual (Taliaferno 2003: 251; Kane 2005: 160-
161; Katzoff 2003: 335; Hassan 1978: 211; Fazli 2005). This understanding of God 
prevents God’s absolute knowledge from eliminating human being’s free will. Here 
God can also be interpreted as only the necessary condition, but not the sufficient 
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condition for human action. Therefore, contrary to what Flew claims, theism’s notion of 
an all-knowing God can in fact be reconciled with libertarianism.  
4.1.2. What does the False Assumption Objection Really Mean? 
Flew’s false assumption objection presents certain difficulties in terms of the 
internal reasoning of religious language and the idea of possible worlds. First of all, 
Flew’s compatibilism and his claim that God could have created human beings that 
always freely choose the right thing (which in fact is a theistic compatibilism thesis) 
contradict each other. This can be clearly seen in Flew’s attempt to justify his own 
compatibilism where he emphasized that the cause of a human-agent’s action is internal 
and defined freedom as the agent being under no external compulsion. However, Flew 
also asserted that the God of theism was the sustaining cause of all, including human 
actions. Now if we accept both of these claims as true, the reasonable conclusion is that 
a human-agent’s action is always caused externally. But then, even the hypnosis case 
Flew used to refute theistic libertarianism ironically becomes a case to falsify his claim 
that God could have created human beings that always and freely choose the right thing. 
As this claim presupposes that the cause of a human being’s action is external, in its 
essence, it is not much different from God hypnotizing all human beings to choose the 
right thing all the time (Gooch 1994: 97-98). 
Moreover, Flew’s claim that God could have created a world where human 
beings always and freely choose the right thing, is contradictory both to theistic 
teachings and to the general agreements that our common sense has about human beings 
and God. For example, even our common sense, as Flew himself agrees (1998: 145) 
tells us that we are “fallible”. Therefore, it is not possible for us to imagine a normal 
human being with qualities such as not being able to do wrong or having no inclination 
to sin. What allows us to define a person as good requires that he is also capable of 
doing bad. Therefore Flew’s hypothetical creation of a free yet infallible human being is 
neither supported by common sense nor theistic teaching. In this respect, Flew’s thesis 
can be qualified as an unrealistic, utopic thesis as Smart has rightfully asserted (1961: 
188). This free yet infallible being that Flew claims God has the power to create, is no 
longer a human being but a different type of being (1961: 193).  
That being said, even if we agree for a moment that such an understanding of 
human being is not problematic, that it is possible and meaningful for a human being to 
have freedom of action and be completely good, such a model would cause another 
problem, the problem eliminating the cognitive freedom of the human being. The 
described human beings would eventually realize that their doing wrong has been 
prohibited. This, then leaves them with no freedom to refuse God’s existence and leave 
them forced to believe in him on a cognitive level. However, looking at this issue from a 
theistic perspective, it could be said that what matters most to God is the voluntary act 
of faith (Dilley 1990: 1-2). Then even if Flew’s approach were accepted as true for the 
sake of argument, human beings would have freedom of action but not freedom of 
thought. 
Also, Flew’s claim that God could have created human beings completely good 
and completely free, if God had absolute power and goodness, would mean requesting 
from God to grant the freedom he has promised to give human beings in heaven while 
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they were still on earth. However, a theist does not perceive the freedom in heaven 
merely in terms of God’s power. Although many theists believe that being in heaven is 
ultimately due to God’s grace, they also believe that they will have deserved this 
freedom in heaven to a certain extent. Human beings do not deserve to enter heaven just 
by being humans per se. This is why Flew’s hypothetical model of a human being who 
never commits wrong or bad actions due to God’s power and goodness, is problematic 
not only in terms of cognitive freedom but also in terms of earned freedom (Yardan 
2001: 110-112).  
Moreover, although Flew’s claim places importance on human freedom, it 
ignores God’s freedom. By asserting that God is obliged to create a world where human 
beings are free in their actions yet are barred from doing wrong, means eliminating 
God’s freedom in order to give human beings a higher level of freedom (Yardan 2001: 
113). 
Also, although a world where human beings always do the right thing while 
maintaining their freedom is conceivable in terms of God’s power, it still cannot be 
expected of him to actually create such a world. This is because for a human being to be 
a free agent, it is required that she chooses to do wrong or err at least once. An agent 
who has the option to but never commits an act is not a free agent. Therefore, if God 
were to actually create one of the possible alternative worlds, this would be a world, 
reasonably speaking, where the free agent would do wrong at least once (Kondoleon 
1983: 6-9), not the world depicted by Flew, where she would never do wrong.  
Furthermore, in the world imagined by Flew, saying a person would do “right 
“or “wrong” has no factual meaning. However, the idea of possible worlds requires such 
counter-factual propositions. Therefore, the claim that due to the lack of contradiction in 
Flew’s idea of the world where the human beings are free and always do the right thing, 
such a world is one of the reasonably possible worlds, is very disputable (Peterson 
1998: 39-40). Moreover, the lack of contradiction does not necessitate the existence of 
something. The lack of contradiction does not oblige God to create a particular world 
chosen from the possible worlds (Yardan 2001: 112-113).  
Therefore, there is no impassable contradiction between theism and 
libertarianism as Flew suggests; the real contradiction is between theism and Flew’s 
own assumption that God could create a world where the human being can freely 
always choose the right thing.  
4.2. Problems With Flew’s Compatibilism  
Flew’s compatibilism seems open to criticism in three main lines of his 
reasoning: Assuming that PCs can solve the problem of the free will, basing 
compatibilism on common sense, and basing arguments on the hypothetical 
interpretation of PAP instead of the categorical.  
4.2.1. Are PCs Sufficient in Justifying Compatibilism? 
First, it should be stated that Flew’s use of PCs to justify his compatibilism is 
highly disputable. Flew’s reasoned that if you can learn the meanings of the notions 
such as ‘acting free’ and ‘being an agent’ by referring to PCs, you cannot claim to 
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support a hard determinism (1960: 19-20). But, PCs are not sufficient to prove a claim 
for certain, although making use of them in solving philosophical questions is not futile, 
either  (Hanfling 2000: 74-75; 1991: 38; Marconi 2009: 118-119). This is because in 
metaphysical discussions such as those on the free will, you can fabricate PCs that both 
support and refute it (Danto 1959: 120-124; Watkins 1957: 25-33; Harre 1958: 96). 
Inwagen points out that using PCs to justify human freedom may require us to 
accept unreasonable results, as well. For instance, imagine that aliens placed a device in 
our brains the moment we were born, forcing us to make our decisions using a certain 
software, but our linguistic practice worked in its regular fashion. In this case, all the 
PCs shown to support the existence of free will are just examples of determined actions 
(Inwagen 2002: 109-110; Daw and Alter 2001: 350-351) From this perspective, there is 
nothing to bar us from perceiving the PCs, such as the threat cases and the marriage 
case which Flew presented to support freedom of action, as cases based on the 
ignorance of the prior causes of the action that was assumed to be committed freely. If 
the prior causes of the action were exactly known, then we would have to admit that the 
sense of freedom is an illusion.  
That being said, it could be argued that PCs are examples from normal people’s 
experiences and that there is no need for fictional scenarios. Two responses can be 
given to this. First, the goal in Inwagen’s approach is not to create fictional scenarios 
but to point out that we are not in a position to know that those cases we saw as 
examples of acting on free will are really examples that demonstrate the existence of 
free will or not. Second, the PCs extracted from real life experience depend on two 
factors: linguistic practice and common sense. However neither of those provides us 
with the certainty looked for by a philosopher.  
Our understanding of the world and our relationship to it is limited to words. In 
other words, we can think of our understanding as being in a linguistic predicament. 
However, if we really are in a linguistic predicament, if we are imprisoned within 
language, then using linguistic analyses and PCs to justify a claim only serves to beg 
questions. For example, if we are not sure that our linguistic practices reflect a factual 
truth, then, contrary to Flew’s suggestion (1987a: 58-59), we are not in a position to 
know that a real difference exists between cause, reason and motive. From this 
perspective, there is no difference between the libertarian description of free will as 
uncaused cause, and Flew’s compatibilist definition of freedom as lack of external 
compulsion.  
Moreover, internal causes of an action, similar to the motives that Flew called 
‘moral causes’, are physical causes just as external causes are. Flew misses this point 
when he states that Mordo’s endocrine glands are not other people or external causes 
that oblige him to act a certain way (1955: 153), or when he argues against the inclusion 
of unconscious desires as determining factors of compulsion (1978: 191-192). His line 
of reasoning may rest on the idea: if I am not the one responsible for my actions, then 
no one is. Their responsibility is all mine. And if I am responsible from them, then it 
shows that I am a free agent.  
However, this reasoning appears problematic in two ways. First it seems to be 
forgetting that in order to grant responsibility to someone, it is first required to prove 
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that he is free. The second, is Flew’s assumption, ‘If I am not the one responsible for my 
actions, then no one is.’ This, as Helm emphasized (1997: 152), does not mean that 
nothing is responsible for them. Here it is possible to attribute responsibility to the 
causally sufficient conditions of the action. Although because ‘responsibility’ is a 
quality that can only be attributed to conscious beings, Flew would not be pleased with 
its use in this context. However, this is a secondary and linguistic problem, not a 
primary and ontological one. External or internal, compulsion is compulsion (Lamont 
1967: 114-115). In a paper written by Robinson where he evaluates Flew’s objections to 
sociobiology, he emphasizes that Flew’s claim for a distinction between moral and 
physical causes justified by linguistic analyses and PCs, was not strong enough to refute 
that the mental states and interests of human beings can be determined ultimately by 
physical causes (1995: 216-218). 
Yet, let’s assume that the said distinction is sound enough to show we are free in 
action. Even then, it cannot show that we are free in terms of will. Freedom in action is 
different than freedom of will. First one implies a freedom in doing what a person 
wishes to do, the second one implies a freedom in wishing something. In the first 
condition, a person can be said to be free as long as he is not forced to act this way or 
that. However, in this kind of an understanding of freedom, an animal can also be 
considered to have freedom of action as long as it is exempt from external compulsion, 
and then the difference between human beings and animals no longer remains (Lester 
2000: 21). 
4.2.2. Common Sense Experience versus Manipulation Argument 
When Flew asserts that freedom and any other ideas related to it result from our 
own experience and that those who are not convinced by these experiences have the 
burden of proof to prove otherwise, it becomes clear that his PCs are based on the 
experience of common sense (1990: 35-36; 1994a: 28). However, the sense of freedom 
derived from our common sense cannot provide us a certain proof. The manipulation 
argument (Pereboom 2014: 71-82; 2001: 110-117) used to deny compatibilist theses 
such as Flew’s, emphasize this point. This argument suggests that PCs exist or can be 
fabricated, where human beings are manipulated by another and still think of 
themselves as free, as in the hypnosis cases discussed. There are no differences between 
manipulated agents and human beings living in a determinism-dominated world. 
Therefore, our sense of freedom is not irreconcilable with the idea that all our behavior 
is determined.  
4.2.3. Principle of Alternative Possibilities 
The last and most difficult problem of Flew’s compatibilism involves Flew’s 
interpretation of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) and also the legitimacy 
of this principle itself. According to it, an agent is responsible for an action only if she 
could do otherwise, which is to say, if she had other alternative possibilities of action 
(Frankfurt 1988: 1-2; 2003: 17-19; Pereboom 2014: 9). In this definition, the principle is 
open to be used by both compatibilists and libertarians. The central idea in this principle 
is the ability to do otherwise, which can be interpreted in two ways. Compatibilists 
understand it hypothetically, whereas libertarians, or incompatibilists, interpret it 
categorically. Compatibilists think that if the conditions a person is in were different, 
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this person could have acted otherwise (Reichenbach 1982: 53). Whereas what’s 
important for libertarians or incompatibilists are, categorically, the person could do 
otherwise even when all the conditions remain the same.  
Reading Flew, it is not easy to say that he is very clear about the meaning of 
“being able to do otherwise”. In his PCs (threat cases), where he emphasizes the 
meaning of freedom as lack of external compulsion, he takes the hypothetical meaning 
of being able to do otherwise, as any consistent compatibilist would do. As Denneth 
wished to highlight (1984: 133-142; 2004: 89-95; Zawidzki 2007: 104), if determinism 
is true, then a person can never be in the “exact” same conditions twice. However, in 
other PCs (marriage and murder cases) where Flew asserts that a human being can 
“resist” against internal causes such as human desires, he seems to base his argument on 
the categorical meaning of being able to do otherwise.  
If he bases his arguments on the categorical meaning, then he would need to 
make a metaphysical or biological explanation to show how the agent could do 
otherwise when all the conditions remained the same. However, Flew only refers to PCs 
without making such an explanation. If he bases his arguments on the hypothetical 
meaning, then this means he is ultimately accepting a pervasive determinism in an 
implicit fashion. As Searle points out, when a person answers ‘no’ to the question if 
they could have done otherwise ‘when all conditions remained the same’ (1994: 767-
768), then there is not much meaning left in talking about freedom.  
At the same time, even if Flew interpreted compatibilism hypothetically or 
categorically, his compatibilism is directly affected by the objection Harry Frankfurt 
had against the verity of PAP.  According to Frankfurt, it is not required that an agent be 
able to do otherwise in order for her to be responsible for her action (1971: 18-19). His 
main point can be stated as follows (1988: 6-10; Eshleman 1997: 269-270): 
For example, say you will decide to commit an action X. However, there is 
something you don’t know: Somebody else is watching you and knows prior to your 
action what you will do. This person has the power to manipulate your brain and your 
nervous system without you knowing it. When you decide to do X, he doesn’t interfere, 
but once he realizes you decided not to do X, he manipulates your thought process and 
makes sure you do X. Now, if you had decided to do X initially, you would have done 
so on your own free will and without any interference. However, you would also have 
been prohibited from doing otherwise. Therefore, a person can be responsible for their 
action even when he is not able to do otherwise. Therefore PAP is false.  
If PAP is false, then Flew’s objection to theistic libertarianism, where he states 
God could have created free human beings who would always do right, is true 
(Eshleman 1997: 284). However, here Flew’s compatibilism is clearly false as it is 
based on PAP in general, whether being able to do otherwise is interpreted 
hypothetically or categorically.  
It is, however, possible to say that Frankfurt’s objection to the verity of PAP is 
problematic. Normally, we hold an agent responsible for an action not only because she 
is able to do it, but also because she was in a situation where she could have prevented it 
from happening (Widerker 2003: 54). Whereas Frankurt-style cases violate this second 
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condition of responsibility, and looking at it as a whole, they dissolve the dominance of 
the agent for her actions. This in fact means that Frankurt-style cases structurally 
assume the legitimacy of determinism. As Goetz (2005: 83-84) and Ekstrom (2002: 
310-312) rightfully emphasized, the inability to do otherwise found in Frankurt-style 
cases can only be perfectly guaranteed by a causal determinism. However, this clearly 
begs the question, supporting compatibilism and arguing against libertarianism. 
Therefore the falseness of PAP is not yet proven. 
If PAP is not false, then even if Flew’s compatibilism thesis is true, his objection 
to theistic libertarianism would be false. Therefore, in conclusion, regardless of the 
verity of PAP, it is not possible for Flew to defend both his compatibilism and object 
theistic libertarianism at the same time. *** 
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Flew’nun Bagdaşırcılığı ve Teistik Liberteryenizme 
İtirazları Üzerine 
 
Özet 
Nedensel bir determinizmin egemen olduğu düşünülen doğal bir dünyada, kendisi 
de bu doğal dünyanın bir parçası olan insanın nasıl olup da özgür bir fail 
olabileceği sorusu, felsefenin en köklü sorularından biri olup genelde basitçe hür 
irade problemi olarak ifade edilmektedir. Bu yazıda problem, Oxford Linguistik 
Felsefe’nin hararetli bir taraftarı ve maharetli bir uygulayıcısı olan Antony 
Flew’nun determinizm ile insan özgürlüğünün bir arada var olabileceğini ifade 
eden bağdaşırcı tezi çerçevesinde ele alınmış ve gerek Flew’nun bağdaşırcılığının 
gerekse de onun teistik özgürlükçülüğe yönelttiği itirazlarının geçerliliği ve 
sağlamlığı tartışılmıştır.  
Flew, yazılarında hur irade problemine başka felsefe problemleri arasında özel bir 
önem vermektedir. Zira ona göre eğer insan hur olma teriminin sağduyudaki 
anlamında gerçekten hur bir varlık olmasaydı hem insan haklarının hem de politik 
ve sosyal özgürlüklerin üzerine inşa edileceği sağlam bir temel bulmak, pratikte 
imkânsız olmasa bile, teorik açıdan, hayli problemli bir şey olurdu. Yine ona göre, 
özgürlüğün insan tabiatında derin ve koklu bir şekilde yerleşmiş olduğunu kabul 
etmeden, fail fikrine dayalı insan bilimlerini nedensellik ilkesine ve doğal 
determinizme dayalı fizik bilimlerden ayırmak da mümkün olmazdı. Eğer 
hakikaten özgür olmasaydık, şimdiye kadar yapageldiğimiz bu iki tur bilim 
arasındaki ayrım anlamsızlaşırdı. Dahası Flew’nun düşüncesinde rasyonellik 
doğası gereği secimde bulunmayı içerdiğinden katı determinizmin egemen olduğu 
bir dünyada gerçek anlamda ne bilmekten ne de rasyonellikten söz etmenin bir 
anlamı vardır. 
Tüm bu sebeplerden dolayı, insan hürriyetinin kabulü, Flew için son derece temel 
bir meseledir. Fakat, buna rağmen, Flew, hur irade problemi söz konusu 
olduğunda, liberteryen bir tezi savunmuyor. Bunun yerine, hem determinizmin 
hem de insan özgürlüğünün ayni anda var olabileceğini savunan bağdaşırcı bir 
iddiada bulunuyor ve liberteryenizmi olduğu kadar katı determinizmi de açıkça 
reddediyor. Flew liberteryenizmden insanın hür bir fail olarak kendi eylemlerinin 
nedenlenmemiş bir nedeni olduğunu, böylece de onun doğal dünyanın nedensel 
determinasyonundan tümüyle muaf olabileceğini öne suren bir tezi anlıyor. Onun 
reddettiği katı determinizm ise insanın tüm eylemlerinin doğada egemen olan 
kuşatıcı bir nedenselliğin zorunlu ve kaçınılmaz bir sonucu olarak meydana 
geldiği, bundan dolayı da doğal bir varlık olan insanın bir fail olarak 
görülemeyeceği tezidir. Flew, böylece, hur irade tartışmasında, kendisini, açık bir 
şekilde, özgürlük ve determinizmi zorunlu olarak birbirlerini dışlayan şeyler 
olarak gören bağdaşmazcılığa karşıt bir konuma yerleştirmiş oluyor. 
Fakat Flew bununla yetinmiyor ve iki spesifik iddiada daha bulunuyor: (1) 
Dilimiz, linguistik pratiklerimiz bağdaşırcılığın doğru olduğunu, nedensel olarak 
belirlenmiş bir dünyada bile özgür olduğumuzu bize gösterebilir. (2) Klasik 
teizmin Tanrısının varlığı ile liberteryen bir hur irade anlayışını ayni anda 
savunmak mümkün değildir.  
İkinci iddia din felsefesi üzerine kaleme alınan yazılarda tartışılmakla birlikte, 
birinci iddia çoğu zaman ya göz ardı edilmiş ya da üzerinde çok fazla ve ayrıntılı 
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bir şekilde durulmamıştır. Oysa birinci iddia ikinciden daha önemlidir. Çünkü, ilk 
olarak, ikinci iddia bir değilleme olduğu için Flew burada kanıt getirme 
yükümlülüğünü teiste bırakıp sadece teistik liberteryen hür irade anlayışının 
sorunlarına işaret etmekle yetinebilir. Fakat birinci iddia bir olumlama olduğu 
için, aynı taktiksel kolaylığa burada sahip değildir, başka deyişle artık kanıt 
getirme yükümlülüğü Flew’nun kendisi üzerindedir. İkinci olarak, Flew’nun 
ikinci iddiası da aslında birinci iddiasına dayanmaktadır. Eğer onun birinci 
iddiasının zayıflığı gösterilebilirse, ikinci iddiasının da gücü zayıflamış olacaktır. 
Başka deyişle, eğer Flew bağdaşırcılığının doğruluğunu ispatlamada başarısız ise, 
bu, onun genelde liberteryenizme özelde de teistik liberteryenizme yönelik 
itirazlarının en azından kuşkuyla karşılanmasına kapı açacaktır. O yüzden bu 
yazıda, her ne kadar Flew’nun teistik liberteryenizme itirazları eleştirel bir 
değerlendirmeye tabi tutulmuş olsa da, temel strateji, onun bağdaşırcı tezinin 
zayıflığını ve iki iddiasını ayni anda savunamayacağını göstermek üzerine 
kurulmuştur.  
Flew gerek birinci, gerekse de ikinci iddiasını desteklemek için bir yandan Model 
Vakalara (Paradigm Case/PC) başvurmakta öte yandan da hür irade literatüründe 
“bir kişinin yaptığı şeyden ancak yaptığından başka türlü yapabilseydi sorumlu 
olacağını” ifade eden Alternatif Olanaklar İlkesini (Principle of Alternative 
Possibilities/PAP) temel hareket noktası olarak almakta ve buradan hareketle, pek 
alışık olmadık bir şekilde, basitçe kişinin kendi eylemlerinin nedeni olduğu 
anlamında bir bağdaşırcı fail nedensellik fikrini savunmaktadır. 
Oysa, Flew’nun teistik liberteryenizme olan itirazları tartışmaya açık olduğu gibi, 
bu itirazların ana dayanağı olan bağdaşırcılığını haklı çıkarmada da bir takım 
sıkıntıları vardır. Flew’nun teistik liberteryenizme yönelik itirazları, üç temel 
başlık altında ele alınabilir: (1) Linguistik ve Epistemolojik Problem, (2) Tutarlılık 
Problemi, (3) Yanlış Varsayım Problemi. Flew’nun itirazlarinin en güçlüsü 
sonuncusudur: Ona göre mutlak anlamda kadir ve mutlak anlamda iyi bir 
Tanri’nin, bu niteliklerinden dolayı, içinde insanın hiçbir zaman yanlış ve kötü 
olanı değil ama her zaman doğru ve iyi olanı yapacağı, buna karşın yine de özgür 
kalmaya devam edeceği bir dünya yaratmasının mümkün olmadığını varsaymak 
teistik liberteryenizmin ardındaki en temel yanlıştır. Tanrı içinde insanın özgürce 
her zaman doğru ve iyi olanı yapacağı bir dünya yaratabilirdi. Ne var ki, teizm ve 
liberteryenizm arasında Flew’nun düşündüğü gibi hiçbir şekilde aşılamaz bir 
tutarsızlık olmadığı gibi, asıl, Flew’nun Tanrı’nın insanın içinde her zaman hürce 
doğru olanı yapacağı bir dünya yaratabileceği iddiasının kendisi teizm ile tutarsız 
gorunmektedır. 
Flew’nun bağdaşırcılığının ise üç temel hususta eleştiriye açık olduğu görülüyor: 
Hur irade probleminin PC’lerle çözülebileceğini varsayması, sağduyuya 
dayanması, PAP’nin kategorik değil hipotetik yorumunu esas alması. Flew’nun 
muhtelif yazılarında sıkça tekrarladığı iki PC’den birisi bir Mafya Babası’nın 
tehdit ettiği insanlar vakası, diğeri de evlenmek üzere olan iki genç Murdo ve 
Mary vakasıdır. O, birinci tür PC’lerde özgürlüğü fail kavramının 
çözümlenmesinden ve başka türlü yapabilme tecrübesinden hareketle 
temellendirmeye çalışırken, ikinci türden PC’lerde onu eylem kavramından yola 
çıkarak açıklamaya çalışır. Ancak, Flew’nun bağdaşırcılığını haklı çıkarmak için 
PC’lere başvurmasının oldukça tartışmalı bir şey olduğunu söylemek gerekir. 
Felsefi meselelerin çözümünde PC’lere başvurmak her ne kadar faydasız olmasa 
da onlar tek başlarına herhangi bir iddiayı “kesin” olarak kanıtlama gücüne sahip 
değillerdir. Herhangi bir iddianın hem lehinde hem aleyhinde PC’ler vermek 
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mümkündür. Ayrıca metafizik bir tartışmada PC’ler kullanmak saçma sonuçları 
da kabul etmeyi gerektirir. Kaldı ki PC’ler iki temel unsura dayanırlar: dilsel 
pratiğimiz ve sağduyu. Fakat bunların ikisi de bize hur irade probleminin çözümü 
için aranan kesinliği verecek güçte değillerdir. Bir defa, bizim dünyaya ve 
dünyayla olan ilişkimize dair anlayışımız dilimizle sınırlıdir. Fakat eğer dilin 
içinde hapsolmuşsak, dolayısıyla da dilsel pratiklerimizin olgusal olarak doğruyu 
yansıttığından emin değilsek, Flew’nun öne sürdüğünün aksine, neden, sebep ve 
motive arasında gerçekten bir fark olduğunu bilecek bir pozisyonda da olamayız. 
Flew’nun ki gibi sağduyu tecrübesine dayanan bağdaşırcı tezler aleyhine 
kullanılan manipülasyon argümanı bu noktaya işaret eder. 
Flew’nun bağdaşırcılığının üçüncü ve en sıkıntılı sorunu ise bir yandan onun 
alternatif olanaklar ilkesini (PAP) nasıl anladığıyla öte yandan da ilkenin doğru 
olup olmamasıyla ilgilidir. İlkedeki merkezi fikir, ‘yaptığından başka türlü 
yapabilme’ fikridir. Bağdaşırcılar onu hipotetik olarak anlarken liberteryenler ya 
da bağdaşmazcılar kategorik olarak anlarlar. Flew’ya gelince, o, özgürlüğün 
‘harici zorlamadan yoksunluk’ olduğunu vurguladığı PC’lerde (tehdit vakaları), 
açıkça, başka turlu yapabilmenin hipotetik anlamını esas alıyor. Ama aynı Flew, 
insanın arzuları gibi dahili nedenlere ‘direnebileceğini’ öne sürdüğü PC’lerde 
(evlilik ve cinayet vakaları) başka türlü yapabilmenin kategorik anlamını temel 
alıyor.  
Simdi, eğer, o, kategorik anlamı esas alıyorsa, tüm koşullar ayni kaldığında failin 
yaptığından başka türlü yapabilmesinin nasıl mümkün olduğuna dair metafizik ya 
da biyolojik bir açıklama vermesi gerekirdi. Fakat, Flew, PC’lere atıfta 
bulunmanın dışında, böyle bir açıklama vermiyor. Eğer, o, hipotetik anlamı esas 
alıyorsa, bu ise, reddettiği katı determinizmi dolaylı olarak da olsa kabul etmesi 
anlamına gelir.  
Bununla beraber, Flew başka türlü yapabilmeyi ister hipotetik ister kategorik 
olarak yorumlamış olsun, onun bağdaşırcılığı, her iki durumda da Harry 
Frankfurt’un PAP’nin doğruluğuna yönelttiği itirazdan doğrudan etkilenir: Eğer 
PAP yanlışsa, o zaman, Flew’nun teistik liberteryenizme itirazı, yani Tanrı hürce 
hep doğru olanı yapacak insanlar yaratabilirdi iddiası, doğru olur. Fakat, bu 
durumda, Flew’nun bağdaşırcılığı, başka turlu yapabilmenin hipotetik mi yoksa 
kategorik mi anlaşılacağına bakmadan, genel anlamda PAP’ye dayandığı için, 
açıkça, yanlış olur. Bununla beraber, Frankfurt tarzı örnekler yapısal olarak 
determinizmin doğruluğunu varsaydıkları için Frankfurt’un PAP’nin doğruluğuna 
yönelttiği itirazın kendisinin yanlış olduğunu söylemek de mümkündür. Ancak, 
eğer PAP yanlış değilse, o zaman, Flew’nun bağdaşırcılık tezi doğru olabilse de, 
bu sefer, onun teistik libarteryenizme itirazı yanlış olur.  
O halde, sonuçta, PAP ister doğru ister yanlış olsun, Flew’nun hem bağdaşırcılık 
iddiasını hem de teistik liberteryenizme itirazını ayni anda savunması mümkün 
görünmemektedir. 
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